Objective: Learn how much it is easy to read contactless tags, possibly simulate/clone.

Requirement:
- Hardware: Reader SCL3711 or ACR122, Reader Proxmark3, Mifare Ultralight Tag, Blank Mifare Ultralight, Mifare UltralightC.
- Software: LibNFC, TamaShell, eLockpicking.
- Computer skills: Basics on Linux, Hexadecimal notation.

Exercise 1: Set up the Environment

This RFID Lab uses the LibNFC library, which directly access to USB devices, contrarily to the PCSC library for example. As a consequence, each command during this RFID Lab should be run in super user mode (sudo <command>) to avoid any access right issues.

LibNFC manages devices compliant with the Near Field Communication (NFC) technology, which is part of the 13.56MHz Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) technology.

1. Check the Reader is Properly Connected to USB Port

To check if the reader is correctly connected, use the lsusb command in the shell window. The command lsusb displays the connected USB devices. When a reader is plugged, a new device appears in the list. Listing 1 is a partial output of the lsusb command when an ACR122 v1.0 is connected. Table 1 provides a list of reader names and identifiers.

```bash
user@linux:~> lsusb
...  
Bus 006 Device 004: ID 072f:90cc Advanced Card Systems, Ltd ACR38 SmartCard Reader
...  
user@linux-ejg5:~>
```

Listing 1: Output of the lsusb Command

2. Check LibNFC Recognizes the Reader

To check whether LibNFC is correctly installed on the computer, plug a reader, and run the command: sudo nfc-list. If the plugged reader is displayed, the library and the reader likely work properly. Listing 2 shows an example of the command output.
### Reader Identifiers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reader</th>
<th>Reader Identifier</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Prox’n’roll</td>
<td>1c34:7141 SpringCard</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCM SCL3711</td>
<td>04e6:5591 SCM Microsystems, Inc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR122 v1.0</td>
<td>072f:90cc Advanced Card Systems, Ltd ACR38 SmartCard Reader</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACR122 v2.0</td>
<td>072f:2200 Advanced Card Systems, Ltd</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Reader Identifiers

```bash
user@linux:~> sudo nfc-list
nfc-list uses LibNFC 1.7.0-rc7
NFC device: / CCID USB Reader opened
user@linux:~>
```

Listing 2: Output of the `nfc-list` Command

### 3. Check TamaShell Dialog Application

TamaShell is a simple tool to interact with LibNFC without programming. TamaShell looks similar to a classical shell but it sends the typed commands to the PN53x microcontroller of the connected reader.

To start with TamaShell, check the reader is plugged, open a shell window, and execute the command: `sudo pn53x-tamashell`. Listing 3 illustrates the expected result.

```bash
user@linux:~> sudo pn53x-tamashell
root’s password:
NFC reader: SCM Micro / SCL3711-NFC& RW opened
>
```

Listing 3: Start a TamaShell Session with a SCL3711 Reader

A simple way to identify the microcontroller of the connected reader consists in using the command 02. This command requires the reader microcontroller to provide its firmware version. Listing 4 illustrates the expected result when a SCL3711 reader is connected.

```bash
> 02
Tx: 02
Rx: 33 02 07 07
>
```

Listing 4: Get the Firmware Version of a SCL3711 Reader

The answer 33 02 07 07 contains several pieces of information:

- **33**: Version of integrated circuit, 32 (resp. 33) is a pn532 (resp. pn533) microcontroller
- **02**: Version of firmware
- **07**: Revision of firmware
- **07**: Functionalities supported by the firmware (see document [2])

To quit TamaShell, simply use the command `quit`. 
Exercise 2: Poll a Tag

The polling is the method to detect if a tag is on the reader.

To communicate with ISO7816-compliant tags, computer applications use APDUs (*Application Protocol Data Unit*) that are sent to the reader, then to the tag. Readers may require the application to embed the APDU into a pseudo-APDU containing additional information used by the reader only. Pseudo-APDUs may also be used to execute internal commands in the reader (in such a case the APDU is not sent to the tag).

An APDU consists of two parts, namely the *request* and the *answer*. An APDU request is always sent by the computer application while a response is always sent by the reader or the tag. A response is received only if a request was previously sent.

ADPUs are sent using low-level applications, e.g. TamaShell and Scriptor, or high-level applications that hide the APDUs and make the interaction between the user and the tag more friendly. In what follows, low-level communications will be performed in order to better understand the communication mechanisms. Appendix A describes the APDU structure. Note that even low-level applications may hide parts of the APDU, which is the case of TamaShell. Listing 5 shows an example of polling with TamaShell.

| > 4a 01 00 |
| Tx: 4a 01 00 |
| Rx: 01 01 00 44 00 07 04 4d 55 a2 f7 23 80 |

Listing 5: Poll a Tag

Description of the command:

- 4a Instruction code for the polling
- 01 Number of tags to poll
- 00 Protocol to use, 0x00 means ISO-14443A

Description of the answer:

- 01 Number of tags found (only one in this example)
- 01 Selected target number
- 00 44 00 Anti-collision data
- 07 Length of the tag UID
- 04 4d 55 a2 f7 23 80 Tag UID

**Question 1:** Put a Mifare Ultralight Tikitag on the reader and poll it.

**Question 2:** Compare the tag UID and the value printed on the tag.

**Question 3:** Poll two arbitrary tags at the same time and observe the result.
Exercise 3: Read Data from a Mifare Ultralight Tag

The command to read a Mifare Ultralight tag is \texttt{40\ 01\ 30\ 00}, where \texttt{00} is the sector number. The command reads four sectors at a time from the provided sector address, here \texttt{00}. If the last sector is reached and more sectors are requested, then the command loops and displays the first sector(s) of the memory. So if the command starts reading from the last sector, the three first sectors are also read. The first part, \texttt{40\ 01}, is the command for the PN53x reader microcontroller, and the last part, \texttt{30\ 00}, is the instruction for the Mifare Ultralight. Listing 6 shows an example of reading a Mifare Ultralight with TamaShell.

| > 40 01 30 00 |
| Tx: 40 01 30 00 |
| Rx: 00 04 4d 55 94 a2 f7 23 80 f6 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 |

Listing 6: Mifare Transmit Command

Description of the request:

- \texttt{40}: Instruction code
- \texttt{01}: Target number
- \texttt{30 00}: Data for the tag (\texttt{30} means “read” and \texttt{00} is the sector number)

Description of the answer:

- \texttt{00}: Status byte
- \texttt{04 4d 55 94 a2 f7 23 80 f6 48 00 00 00 00 00 00 00}: Data read from the tag

**Question 1:** Read the content of the Tikitag Mifare Ultralight tag.

**Question 2:** Using Appendix B, check the data contains the tag UID.

**Question 3:** Using Appendix B and the Mifare Ultralight data sheet [3] (Section 7.5.2), identify the memory sectors that are writable.
Exercise 4: Write Data on a Mifare Ultralight Tag

The instruction to write data on a Mifare Ultralight tag is `40 01 a0 05 aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00` where the first part of the instruction, `40 01`, is the instruction for the reader microcontroller and the second part, `a0 05 aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00`, is the instruction for the Mifare Ultralight. This instruction writes 4 bytes only, but requires a 12-byte padding for compatibility reasons. Listing 7 shows an example of writing data on a Mifare ultralight with TamaShell.

| > 40 01 a0 05 aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tx: 40 01 a0 05 aa bb cc dd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| Rx: 00 |

Listing 7: Write on the Tag

Instructions for the microcontroller:

40 Instruction code for the reader
01 Number of the target for the reader

Instructions for the Mifare Ultralight:

a0 Mifare Ultralight code for the writing
05 Sector number to write on the tag
aa bb cc dd Data to write on the tag
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Padding

The value 00 returned by the microcontroller means the operation succeeded.

**Question 1:** Translate your first name from ASCII to HEX[^1], and write it somewhere in your blank Mifare Ultralight tag. Be careful not to write on Sectors 0x00 to 0x03.

**Question 2:** Give your tag to another person and get his own tag.

**Question 3:** Reading the card, retrieve the first name of the person.

[^1]: Use for example the website [http://www.asciitohex.com/](http://www.asciitohex.com/)
Exercise 5: Authentication with Mifare UltralightC

Exercice 5 aims to explain how the authentication protocol of a Mifare UltralightC tag can be performed using APDUs.

Theory

The Mifare UltralightC uses a mutual authentication protocol based on secret keys shared between the tag and the computer. The authentication requires four messages.

- **Message 1**: The reader sends a challenge request to the tag.
- **Message 2**: The tag answers with a random challenge ciphered with the shared key.
- **Message 3**: The reader concatenates a new random challenge with the tag’s challenge, then sends to the tag the result ciphered with the shared key.
- **Message 4**: The tag answers with the ciphered reader’s challenge.

Fig. 1 shows the four messages of the authentication protocol (notation provided below).

\textbf{ChallengeX} ( \( X = 1 \) or 2) : A list of 8 random bytes. For example, \([0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88]\) is a valid challenge.

\textbf{ChallengeX’}: Transformation of ChallengeX where the first byte is moved to the end. For example, ChallengeX provided above becomes the following list of bytes: \([0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x11]\).

\textbf{A||B}: Concatenation of the lists of bytes A and B. For example, the concatenation of ChallengeX and ChallengeX’ provided above is: \([0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x11]\).

\textbf{E_k(A)}: List of bytes A ciphered with the 3DES algorithm using the key \( k \).

![Figure 1: Mifare UltralightC Mutual Authentication Protocol](image-url)
Example

Step 1

The first step consists in getting a challenge from the tag. The TamaShell command is `42 1a 00`. Listing 8 shows an example of the “get challenge” process. Document [4] provides more details about the Mifare UltralightC.

```
> 42 1a 00
Tx:  42 1a 00
Rx:  00 af cc 7e 3c 23 74 14 32 c7
>
```

Listing 8: Request for a challenge

The last 8 bytes of the answer are the ciphered challenge:

\[ E_k(\text{Challenge1}) \]

is \[ [0xcc, 0x7e, 0x3c, 0x23, 0x74, 0x14, 0x32, 0xc7] \]

Step 2

The tag challenge should now be deciphered with the 3DES algorithm, the key `49 45 4D 4B 41 45 52 42 21 4E 41 43 55 4F 59 46`, an initialization vector equal to zero, and no padding. Listing 9 shows an example of deciphering. The detail of this command is out of the scope of this lab.

```
user@linux:~> echo cc7e3c23741432c7 | xxd -p -r | openssl enc -des-ede-cbc -d -K 49454D4B41455242214E4143554F5946 -iv 0000000000000000 -nopad | xxd -p
0db7776b547db2ec
```

Listing 9: Decipher the Tag Challenge

The following list of bytes is \texttt{Challenge1}:

\[ [0x0d, 0xb7, 0x76, 0xb5, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xb2, 0xec] \]

Step 3

The tag challenge, \texttt{Challenge1}, must be converted to \texttt{Challenge1’}. The following list of bytes \[ [0x0d, 0xb7, 0x76, 0xb5, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xb2, 0xec] \] becomes \[ [0xb7, 0x76, 0xb5, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xb2, 0xec, 0x0d] \]. Remember, the first byte goes at the end of the list.

Step 4

The reader side must generate its challenge too, \texttt{Challenge2}. For example the following list of bytes: \[ [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88] \].

Step 5

This step consists in concatenating \texttt{Challenge2} with \texttt{Challenge1’}, which leads with the data from step 3 and 4 to: \[ [0x11, 0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0xb7, 0x76, 0xb5, 0x47, 0xd3, 0xb2, 0xec, 0x0d] \]
Step 6

The concatenated list of bytes must be ciphered before to be sent to the tag. Listing 12 shows an example of the ciphering process. The data of the step 5 is used. This is the second ciphered message exchanged. From now until the end of the communication, each initialization vector will be the least significant 8 bytes of the last message exchanged with the tag. So in this case, the initialization vector is the ciphered challenge received from the tag at Step 1, namely $E_k(\text{Challenge}1)$.

```
user@linux:~> echo 1122334455667788b776b547d3b2ec0d | xxd -p -r | openssl enc -des-ede-cbc -e -K 49454D4B41455242214E4143554F5946 -iv cc7e3c23741432c7 -nopad | xxd -p 0c9e12133590921ba9c0d46f774ff159
```

Listed 10: Cipher Computer and Tag Challenges

The result is $E_k(\text{Challenge}2||\text{Challenge}1') = [0x0c, 0x9e, 0x12, 0x13, 0x35, 0x90, 0x92, 0x1b, 0xa9, 0xc0, 0xd4, 0x6f, 0x77, 0x4f, 0xf1, 0x59]$

Step 7

The second part of the authentication protocol is done by sending to the tag the command 42 af followed by the 16 bytes of Step 6. Listing 11 illustrates this communication. If the tag’s answer is RF Transmission Error, this means the authentication has failed. Otherwise, the result of the command is $E_k(\text{Challenge}2')$, which should be in this example [0x06, 0xc2, 0x1e, 0xd4, 0x3e, 0x60, 0xd6, 0x3d].

```
> 42 af 0c 9e 12 13 35 90 92 1b a9 c0 d4 6f 77 4f f1 59
Tx: 42 af 0c 9e 12 13 35 90 92 1b a9 c0 d4 6f 77 4f f1 59
Rx: 00 00 06 c2 1e d4 3e 60 d6 3d
```

Listing 11: Send the Ciphered Message

Step 8

The last step is the deciphering of the tag’s answer. The initialization vector is the last 8 bytes exchanged with the tag, i.e., the last 8 bytes of $E_k(\text{Challenge}2||\text{Challenge}1')$.

```
user@linux:~> echo 06c21d43e60d63d | xxd -p -r | openssl enc -des-ede-cbc -d -K 49454D4B41455242214E4143554F5946 -iv a9c0d46f774ff159 -nopad | xxd -p 2233445566778811
```

Listing 12: Decipher the Tag’s Answer

If the result of this command is the following list of bytes, $\text{Challenge}2': [0x22, 0x33, 0x44, 0x55, 0x66, 0x77, 0x88, 0x11]$, then authentication succeeded.

Practice Yourself

Question 1: Make an authentication with a Mifare UltralightC using the default key.

Question 2: Read Sector 0x05 to Sector 08.

Question 3: Is the key used in this exercise the default key provided in Appendix C?.
Exercise 6: Eavesdropping and Simulating with a Proxmark

Exercice 6 aims to demonstrate how easy is the simulation of a HF tag.

Proxmark Set Up

Be careful with the device installation, irreversible damages can occur if the computer is connected on the antenna port. As illustrated in Figure 2, the computer port on Proxmark is a mini USB port type-B, while the antenna connector on Proxmark is a Hirose Electric low profile port.

![Proxmark Connections](image)

Figure 2: Proxmark Connections

Before launching the software, the device identifier must be known. List the device directory, then plug the device and finally list the directory again. A new device shall appear on the list, it is Proxmark. Listing 13 shows an example of device name. The device name is system-dependent and may have a slightly different name.

```bash
user@linux:~> ls /dev/
... /
/dev/ttyACM0 ...
```

Listing 13: Device Identification

To start the software, run the command `proxmark3 DEVICE_NAME` in a shell window with the device name identified at the previous step. If the reader is not correctly connected, an error message will be printed and the software will exit. Listing 14 shows how to run the Proxmark software.

```bash
user@linux:~> sudo cd /home/elock/Elockpicking/pm3/client/
user@linux:~> sudo ./proxmark3 /dev/ttyACM0
```

Listing 14: Run the Proxmark Software
The last step is the antenna connection, plug the high frequency antenna on the connection port of the reader. Then run the command `hw tune` in the Proxmark software. If the antenna is correctly connected, the voltage printed on the output next to HF antenna will have a positive value. Listing 15 shows an output example. There is no LF antenna connected, so the LF antenna voltage has a zero value. If the HF antenna has a zero value, check the connection and the antenna. Proxmark is now ready to be used.

```
proxmark3> hw tune
#db# Measuring antenna characteristics, please wait...
#db# Measuring complete, sending report back to host
# LF antenna:  0.00 V @  125.00 kHz
# LF antenna:  0.00 V @  134.00 kHz
# LF optimal:  0.00 V @  12000.00 kHz
# HF antenna:  8.80 V @  13.56 MHz
# Your LF antenna is unusable.
proxmark3>
```

Listing 15: Test the Antenna

### Eavesdropping a Communication

Eavesdropping is one of the most interesting feature of Proxmark. The following exercise will show how to eavesdrop a communication and how to analyze the captured data.

To eavesdrop, put the Proxmark antenna between a Mifare Ultralight tag and a reader. Start the eavesdropping with the command `hf 14a snoop` in Proxmark’s shell. Poll and read the tag using for example Tamashell (polling is `4a 01 00` and reading the first sector is `40 01 30 00`). Press Proxmark’s button to stop eavesdropping. Finally, use `hf 14a list` in Proxmark’s shell to obtain the evedropped messages.

**Question 1:** Eavesdrop and analyze the anticollision process. Use the datasheet of Mifare Ultralight [3] to identify the following requests sent from the reader: REQA, anticollision pass 1, select level 1, anticollision pass 2. And the following answers sent from the tag: ATQA, SAK, UID part 1, and UID part 2.

### Emulating a Communication

In this part, no tag is needed. Proxmark will be the tag. Remove the Mifare Ultralight tag from the reader but let the Proxmark antenna on the SCL3711 or ACR122 reader. The emulation is done using the Proxmark command `hf 14a sim`.

**Question 2:** Emulate a Mifare Ultralight tag with the 7-byte UID: `11223344556677`.

**Question 3:** Poll the tag with the SCL3711 or ACR122 reader. Conclude.
Appendix A: Application Protocol Data Unit

An *Application Protocol Data Unit* (APDU) is a data structure used to communicate with a tag. Note that readers can intercept APDUs to execute internal commands as well. For example, sending an appropriate APDU to an ACR 122 Reader allows to switch off its LED. An APDU consists of two parts, namely the *request* and the *answer*. An APDU request is always sent from the computer to either the reader microcontroller or the tag. An APDU response is always sent from reader or tag to the computer. A request is received only if a request was previously sent.

1. APDU Request

Table 2 summarizes the APDU fields:

- **The class field** indicates the instruction type. For example, the instruction class of a Mifare Desfire tag is **0x90**. Many readers intercept the instruction class **0xFF** because this value is not valid in the APDU standard.

- **The instruction field** indicates the action to be executed. For example, a read instruction, a write instruction, etc.

- **The argument 1** and **argument 2** are the parameters of the instruction. For example in a write instruction, the address of the file to write.

- **The data length** indicates the length of the data field. In most cases, the length of this field is 1 byte.

- **The data field** contains the data of the instruction. For example in a write instruction, the content of the file.

- **The response length expected** contains the amount of data to retrieve from the tag or from the reader. For example, the size to read in a read instruction. In most cases, the length of this field is 1 byte. Sometimes the value **0x00** implies any response length.

With some devices, the fields Lc and Le are not required if their value is equal to zero. Refer to the documentation of the given device to get more information.

2. APDU Response

The response to an APDU request has a simple structure consisting of two fields, represented in Table 3: the data field, whose content is related to the APDU request, and the status word, whose value means success, warning or error. For example if the APDU request contains a reading command, the data field of the answer will contain the data read. The first byte of the status word, **sw1**, is in most case the code type, and the second byte, **sw2**, is the status code. For example, the generic success code is **[0x90 0x00]**.
### Table 2: APDU Fields

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field name</th>
<th>Short name</th>
<th>Field length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Class of the instruction</td>
<td>CLA</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Instruction</td>
<td>INS</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument 1</td>
<td>P1</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Argument 2</td>
<td>P2</td>
<td>1 byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data length</td>
<td>Lc</td>
<td>1 to 3 bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Data</td>
<td></td>
<td>Lc byte</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response length expected</td>
<td>Le</td>
<td>1 to 3 bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Table 3: APDU Answer

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field name</th>
<th>Short name</th>
<th>Field length</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Response data</td>
<td>data</td>
<td>Le bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Status word</td>
<td>sw1-sw2</td>
<td>2 bytes</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 3. APDU Example

The APDU request of Table 4 shows how to use the structure. This fake instruction aims to illustrate the fields. The Lc field contains the data length, 0x05 in this example, which means there are 5 data bytes.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CLA</th>
<th>INS</th>
<th>P1</th>
<th>P2</th>
<th>Lc</th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Le</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>00</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>01 02 03 04 05</td>
<td>03</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4: Example of APDU Request

Table 5 shows an APDU response that could be a valid answer to the APDU request of Table 4. Here, the data length is 0x03, which is the value of the field Le in the request.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Data</th>
<th>sw1-sw2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>01 02 03</td>
<td>90 00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5: Example of APDU Response
Appendix B: Memory Organization of the Mifare Ultralight

The Mifare Ultralight [3] is probably one of the simplest tag of the Mifare family. It holds 16 sectors of 4 bytes and has two main instructions: read and write. Table 7 shows the memory organization of this tag. The two first sectors and the two first bytes of the third sector are read-only. The two last bytes of the third sector and the fourth sector are one-time programming: writing is possible but once a bit is set to the value 1, it can not be restored to 0. The lock bytes are used to disable the writing on the user memory. All remaining sectors are free of use.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page Address</th>
<th>0</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>UID_0</td>
<td>UID_1</td>
<td>UID_2</td>
<td>CRC_0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>UID_3</td>
<td>UID_4</td>
<td>UID_5</td>
<td>UID_6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>CRC_1</td>
<td>internal</td>
<td>lock bytes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x03</td>
<td>One time programming</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x05</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x06</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x07</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x08</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x09</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0A</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0B</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0C</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0D</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0E</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x0F</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6: Mifare Ultralight Memory Structure
Appendix C: Memory Organization of the Mifare UltralightC

The memory structure of the Mifare UltralightC [4] is provided in Table 7. The Mifare UltralightC benefits from cryptographic mechanisms, which allows a mutual authentication between the tag and the reader.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector Address</th>
<th>Byte Number</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sector Address</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>UID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>0x00</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>UID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>0x01</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>UID</td>
<td>UID</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0x02</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Internal</td>
<td>Lock bytes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x03</td>
<td>0x03</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>One time programming</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x04 to 0x27</td>
<td>0x04 to 0x27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>User memory</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x28</td>
<td>0x28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Lock bytes</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x29</td>
<td>0x29</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>16-bit counter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2A</td>
<td>0x2A</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Authentication configuration 0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2B</td>
<td>0x2B</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Authentication configuration 1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2C to 0x2F</td>
<td>0x2C to 0x2F</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Authentication key (see Table 8)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7: Mifare Ultralight Memory Structure

The byte **authentication configuration 0** allows to set the first sector address that requires an authentication. All sectors from this address to the end of the memory require an authentication. For example, if the **authentication configuration 0** byte is set to 0x15, then all sectors from 0x15 to 0x2f will require an authentication. The default value of **authentication configuration 0** is 0x28.

The byte **authentication configuration 1** is used to define whether the authentication is required for reading or reading/writing the sectors. There are only two allowed values: 0x01 when the authentication is only required for writing, and 0x00 when the authentication is required for reading and writing. The default value of **authentication configuration 1** is 0x00.

The **authentication key** sectors store a 3DES key (16 bytes), whose default value is "BREAKMEIFYOUCAN!" converted from ASCII to HEX: [0x49, 0x45, 0x4D, 0x42, 0x41, 0x45, 0x52, 0x42, 0x21, 0x4E, 0x41, 0x41, 0x43, 0x55, 0x4F, 0x59, 0x46].

Table 8 shows how the key is stored. Note that it is not possible to read the value of the key because the sectors are write only: trying to read them produces an error. Modifying the key is done by writing the new key on the last four sectors of the tag, which requires to be authenticated. Be careful, the way the keys are stored is not intuitive.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sector address</th>
<th>byte 0</th>
<th>byte 1</th>
<th>byte 2</th>
<th>byte 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0x2C</td>
<td>Key byte 7</td>
<td>Key byte 6</td>
<td>Key byte 5</td>
<td>Key byte 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2D</td>
<td>Key byte 3</td>
<td>Key byte 2</td>
<td>Key byte 1</td>
<td>Key byte 0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2E</td>
<td>Key byte 15</td>
<td>Key byte 14</td>
<td>Key byte 13</td>
<td>Key byte 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0x2F</td>
<td>Key byte 11</td>
<td>Key byte 10</td>
<td>Key byte 9</td>
<td>Key byte 8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8: Storage of the Key on Mifare UltralightC

**Acknowledgment**

Thanks to Jonathan Delvaux for his technical support, and Romain Capron for testing the exercises.

**References**